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Abstract: Cooperating behavior may be fostered by personality traits
reflecting either favorable inclination to others or willingness to comply with
norms and rules. We test the relative importance of these two factors in an
experiment where subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with
identical task, differing only by whether others’ payment is affected. If the first
hypothesis is true, subjects reporting high Agreeableness score should put more
effort; if the second is true, reporting higher Conscientiousness should predict
more effort. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis but not
for the first, as subjects reporting high Altruism do not behave consistently
with this statement.
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1 Introduction
Personality traits of individuals working together in economic organizations
may significantly affect their performance, beyond what one can predict relying
on measures of risk attitude, time preferences and effort cost. This insight has
already made its way in the business practice. Personality tests are now a
frequent practice in the process of applicant selection in many large firms:
recently the BBC News Magazine reported1 that that 89 of the Fortune 100
companies use some test to assess the personality of the job applicants. In
general, analysis of personality may provide us with a reliable characterization
of systematic elements in the behavior of an individual. Several studies suggest
what the genetic and neural basis of the traits are likely to be.2
Economic analysis has only recently started to address the question on how
measure of personality affect individuals performances, especially in organized
groups. Here we test experimentally whether cooperating and trusting behav-
ior can be successfully explained by personality reflecting generally empathic
attitude, helpful and unselfish orientations to others, or rather by personality
traits revealing willingness to comply with norms and rules. We find strong
support for the second hypothesis.
In our data, personality trait revealing a more favorable inclination to oth-
ers is Agreeableness, defined as: “The degree to which a person needs pleasant
and harmonious relations with others” (Costa and McCrae, 1992); and it is
measured by explicitly asking to report cooperation (question 42), trust (22),
helpful and kind attitude to others (7, 12, 27, 32, 37).3
The other trait likely to explain cooperative behavior is Conscientiousness,
defined as: “The degree to which a person is willing to comply with conventional
1http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18723950
2See deYoung and Gray 2010 for a comprehensive description of this literature.
3We report the statements that enter into the Agreeableness score. Subjects had to
indicate whether they agreed with the statement as a description of them. The number
indicates the order of presentation, (R) indicating reverse coding: 2. Tends to find fault
with others (R). 7. Is helpful and unselfish with others. 12. Starts quarrels with others (R).
17. Has a forgiving nature. 22. Is generally trusting. 27. Can be cold and aloof (R). 32. Is
considerate and kind to almost everyone. 37. Is sometimes rude to others (R). 42. Likes to
cooperate with others.
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rules, norms, and standards (Costa and McCrae, 1992). The trait can be
measured by survey questions asking subjects to report reliability and care in
work (3, 8, 13, 18, 23, 33) and consistency in carrying out plans (38, 43).4 Here
we use the big five personality traits to test the effect of altruistic preferences,5
and respect of norms on the cooperative behavior.
Since our interest is in understanding the working of real life social institu-
tion, we insist that decisions on cooperation and trust should involve an effort
cost (mental effort in our design), rather than monetary transfer. There are
two reasons for this emphasis on effort provision as opposed to monetary trans-
fer. The first is ecological validity. In all organizations, the cost of productive
work is most commonly effort rather than monetary transfers. The second is
degree of monitoring and the incentives to “fake” a trait (see e.g. Borghans
et al., 2008 for an helpful discussion); monetary transfers are usually perfectly
observable, but effort provision is not because its effect on observable outcome
is confounded by skill and chance. This different degree of monitoring affects
incentives. If a person claims to be unselfish, she is bound, in order to be
credible to others as well as to herself, to make monetary transfers consistent
with this claim. If instead the test of her claim is effort provision, which is not
well monitored, checking the consistency with such claims is hard, thus she is
not bound by the claims. As a corollary of this reasoning, it seems natural to
conjecture that whereas monetary transfers might be strongly correlated with
claims of being unselfish and caring, effort provision will not. This is what we
find in our data.
Our method relies on the comparison between the performance in a control
treatment where effort of an individual affects his own payment and only his
own, and the performance in a treatment (called cooperative) where effort of
an individual affects the payment of a different, randomly chosen, anonymous
4Here are the statements entering into the Conscientiousness score: 3. Does a thorough
job. 8. Can be somewhat careless (R). 13. Is a reliable worker. 18. Tends to be disorganized
(R). 23. Tends to be lazy (R). 33. Does things efficiently. 38. Makes plans and follows
through with them. 43. Is easily distracted (R).
5In relation to this, Borghans et al., 2008 report: “ To date, there has been no attempt to
relate social preferences to the Big Five personality traits that we discuss next, even though
at an intuitive level social preferences should be linked with empathy and outgoingness.”
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subject. The tasks in the two treatments are identical, so the two treatments
differ in the way in which final payoffs are computed, not the way in which
effort is provided or effort translates into performance. In the control treatment
each subject performs two series of ten additions and a third series where
she adds the two previously obtained series of numbers. The subject is paid
proportionally to the number of correct answers to the last series, so the three
series of additions are perfectly complementary to obtain the right numbers. In
this treatment the final payment depends only on the effort of the subject. In
the cooperative treatment each subject is part of a team of two randomly and
anonymously matched individuals, and exchanges the second series of addition
with the partner. Hence in the cooperative treatment, the final outcome of
each teammate is dependent on the effort of both. The interaction is one-shot
and simultaneous.
As they complete the first addition, subjects have to anticipate the quality
of the input that others will provide them; so their effort will be higher if they
trust others to provide adequate effort, or to be of appropriate skill. Instead,
when they do the second addition, they might consider that their output will
influence the payment to others; so their effort will be higher if they care
about the outcome of others (according to the hypothesis that a personality
revealing other-regarding preferences drives their behavior) or if they feel that
works need to be carried out properly independently from the personal reward,
because intrinsically motivated by the fact that a “correct” behavior should
be followed.
The measure of Agreeableness is not a good predictor of the performance in
the cooperative treatment, as compared with the individual treatment. Thus
the first hypothesis that cooperation is driven by self-reported social prefer-
ences finds little support. To further investigate the reason for the absence of
an effect of Agreeableness we analyzed the impact of two aspects (or facets)
of this trait that should in theory be relevant for our experiment. The facet
altruism should positively affect the addition the subjects pass to their part-
ners, whereas the facet trust should be positively associated to the addition
the subjects perform for themselves (first addition) in expectation that the
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partners perform correctly the second. While trust is a correct predictor of
the first addition in the cooperative treatment,6 altruism has no effect. In
other words, subjects declaring a stronger willingness to help others do not
behave consistently when they need to help other subjects is achieving their
goals in our experiment.
On the contrary, subjects who report higher Conscientiousness are better in
both trusting and helping the partner to achieve better results in the coopera-
tive treatment; this also holds when we compare the outcome with that in the
individual treatment, where Conscientiousness is not a performances’ predic-
tor. This finding provides support for our second hypothesis that cooperation
is explained by intrinsic motivation and reliability.
Neuroticism is associated with higher sensitivity to negative rewards, thus
higher responsiveness to the negative side of incentives.7 Important consider-
ations may be fear of failing or not achieving a result, and a negative response
of others to the failure to produce good output in a cooperative effort. These
factors may induce individuals with higher Neuroticism score to higher effort
in the cooperative treatment. Accordingly, in our experiment subjects with
higher Neuroticism score are more effective in helping the partner to achieve
better results. The direction of the effect is particulary interesting. It is nega-
tive when individuals have a full incentive to provide optimal effort, but seems
to turn positive when this effort is devoted to help the other.
To the best of our knowledge, in this paper we perform the first laboratory
experiment on the economic effect of personality in strategic situations where
the final outcome is based on real effort rather than monetary cost. Hirsh and
Peterson (2009) and Pothos et al. (2010) link personality traits to strategic
behavior in experiments but use the classic prisoner dilemma game. Anderson
et al (2011) analyze the effect of traits on the trust game using a large sample
6This result lends further support to the literature using the self-reported level of general
trust to build an index of the level of social capital (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and
Keefer, 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010)
7For convenience we report the statements entering into the Neuroticism score: 4. Is
depressed, blue. 9. Is relaxed, handles stress well (R). 14. Can be tense. 19. Worries a lot.
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset (R). 29. Can be moody. 34. Remains calm in
tense situations (R). 39. Gets nervous easily.
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of truck driver trainees. Becker et al. (2012) analyze the effect of the per-
sonality traits on the trust game, in the dictator game, and in the punishing
behavior in a modified prisoner dilemma game. Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2013) focus
on the gift exchange game. We will discuss how their findings are related to
ours in the discussion session. As in our paper, the design of Fre´chette’s et
al. (2013) is not based on a classic laboratory game. They frame their labo-
ratory experiment as a relationship between an investor and an intermediary
and show how the big five personality traits influence decision under risk when
information is not readily available to the investors. In their paper personality
affects the way individuals collect and transmit information not ready avail-
able, so, personality affects outcome when the tasks are performed jointly by
two individuals, an investor and the intermediary.
Testing whether common measures of Agreeableness or Conscientiousness,
or both, influence behavior in tasks where actions affect outcomes of others
may throw light on the broader debate on cooperation. Several strands in
the literature explore the effects of monetary and non monetary incentives on
behavior, in decision and strategic environments. The first strand focuses on
intrinsic motivation to work, defined as the motivation to exercise effort driven
by the enjoyment of the activity, rather than material rewards (e.g. Gneezy
and Rustichini 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2003). A second strand focuses on
social norms, where behavior is explained by consistency of beliefs of members
of society (e.g. Konow, 2000; Bicchieri, 2006; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006).
The third strand makes strategic behavior originate in preferences on social
rather than individual outcomes, i.e. social preferences. This is originated
by a large literature based on laboratory experiments where subjects plays
games involving monetary transfer. (e.g. Camerer and Weigelt, 1988, for
an experiment showing reciprocity; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000, provide evidences for inequity aversion; Andreoni and Miller,
2002, focus on altruism; Charness and Rabin, 2002, introduce the social welfare
in the individuals’ utility function). More recently social preferences have been
analysed outside the laboratory; List (2006) shows that when real market
transaction are involved individual behavior can be better predicted by self-
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interest and, more related to the current paper, Stoop et al. (2013) argue that
in an experiment with real effort, subjects prefer to maximize private outcomes
instead of cooperating for a social optimal outcome.
Empirical studies of the links between personality and economic perfor-
mances show significant predictive power of some traits, which offer indirect
support for our findings. Barrick and Mount (1991) present a meta-analysis
showing how Conscientiousness is a good predictor in all job performances.
Almlund et al., (2011) study the correlations of the Big Five and IQ with job
performance, and show that of the Big Five, Conscientiousness is the most as-
sociated with job performance (is about half as predictive as IQ). This finding,
generally confirmed by a number of other studies, is consistent with our result
that conscientiousness is an important trait for cooperation, if we consider the
pervasiveness of cooperation in almost all kinds of jobs.
The literature in experimental psychology dealing with team work and
personality has focused on the qualitative nature of the roles within the team;
analyzing how traits influence the allocation of task roles and social roles
and emphasizing how Conscientiousness is important for the first and Agree-
ableness for the second, hence in promoting social cohesion (Blumberg 2001,
Stewart et al. 2005). Other studies have analysed the impact of personality on
team settings (e.g. LePine et al., 1997; Barrick et al., 1998; Mount et al., 1998;
Barry and Stewart, 1999; Neuman and Wright, 1999). These studies are not in
contrast with ours and, although interesting and relevant for the economist, do
not usually focus on the variables usually considered in economic models. In
addition, studies in psychology usually do not provide appropriate incentives
to participants. Nevertheless, our result that personality has a such differ-
ent impact on cooperative rather than individual effort for otherwise identical
tasks and the inconsistent behaviour of subject declaring high altruism are, to
the best of knowledge, new and possibly relevant with respect to psychology
literature as well.
The Big Five theory (Costa and McCrae; 1992) enjoys wide acceptance
among personality psychologists. The five traits were initially derived from
the analysis of the terms used in natural languages by people to describe them-
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selves and others. More recently several studies have demonstrated a biological
underpinning of the personality traits. For example, using analysis based on
the difference between DZ and MZ twins, Rieman et al. (1997) show that, for
all five factors, genetic effects were the strongest source of the phenotypic vari-
ance on the personality traits measured via self-report, accounting of about
50 percent of the variance. Other studies (see Loehlin’s, 1992, meta analy-
sis) based on the difference between twins reared apart and reared together
show that shared sibling environment effects contributed little to phenotypic
variance. The link of personality with neural structures is analyzed in a large
literature on the neuroscience of personality. Empathy is linked to brain sys-
tems that are involved in social information processing (see Seitz, Nickel and
Azari, 2006 for a meta-analysis based on 80 studies). Serotonin and Glucose
production is associated with Conscientiousness and self-discipline in particu-
lar (e.g. Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007), prefrontal cortex seems likely to be
involved as well (e.g. Brown et al., 2006). Neuroticism is linked to higher
sensitivity to negative emotions like anger, hostility or depression (e.g. Clark
and Watson, 2008), is associated with structural features of the brain systems
associated with sensitivity to threat and punishment (DeYoung and Gray,
2010) and with low levels of serotonin in turns associated with aggression,
poor impulse control, depression, and anxiety (Spoont 1992).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment; sec-
tion 3 describes the main results, and show that the result that agreeableness
is not a positive predictor of effort in cooperation is robust to alternative speci-
fications of the model. In section 4 we discuss the main results, show the effect
of self-reported altruism and trust. In the appendix we provide a formal time-
line of the experiment. The questionnaire completed at the end by subjects,
the experimental instructions, the comprehension quiz presented to the sub-




The design has two treatments, called control and cooperative. Subjects per-
formed exactly the same tasks in both treatments, but the final outcome in the
control treatment only depended on the individual effort of each subject, while
the final outcome in the cooperative treatment was determined by a combina-
tion of the effort of two subjects, randomly and anonymously matched.
Treatments and Tasks
In the control treatment subjects solved a simple arithmetic problem of adding
three series of ten two-digit numbers in the following way (a more formal
timeline of the experiment is presented in appendix 4):
1. Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits numbers
randomly chosen by the computer, in 4 minutes. Let S1i be the answers
provided.
2. Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers randomly chosen by the computer, in 4 minutes. Let S2i be the
answers provided.
3. Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above and the 10 numbers ob-
tained in step 2 above, producing for each i an answer S3i in 2 minutes.
In the cooperative treatment subjects performed the same sequence of ad-
ditions, but jointly with an anonymous subject, as follows:
1. Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits numbers
randomly chosen by the computer, in 4 minutes. Let S1i be the answers
provided.
2. Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers randomly chosen by the computer, in 4 minutes. Let S2i be the
answers provided.
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3. The output of these 10 additions, S2i , i = 1, . . . , 10 is transferred to a
randomly matched and anonymous partner, and the 10 numbers output
produced by this partner is transferred in turn to the subject. We denote
by S∗2i the values of the sum that the partner makes.
4. Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above, S1i , and the 10 numbers
obtained from the randomly matched partner, S∗2i , and producing an
output S3i in 2 minutes.
Let Cki denotes the correct final amount from each of the three series of ad-
ditions specified above, with k = 1, 2, 3, for each addition i. In both cases,
the payment rule was 15 British Pounds Sterling (GBP), approximately 26 US
Dollars (USD), minus 1 in the event of an incorrect final sum: to be precise,
the subject lost one pound (and only one pound) for each i such that S3i 6= C3i .
In all steps a clock on the screen was displaying the time elapsed. In the
cooperative treatment we reminded subjects at the beginning of the second
step that the 10 additions they were about to make would then be used by
another subject. We chose this exercise of summing in a fairly generous amount
of time because we believe it is a rather elementary tasks for our pool of
subjects, where it is less likely that the skill per se matters and it is mostly
how much attention each subjects pay to the task (we will further discuss in
section 3 the implication of this feature of the experiment).
A set of instructions in hard copy (available in the supplementary material)
was distributed at the beginning and subjects were quizzed with 3 questions of
progressive difficulty to check their comprehension. All subjects’ answers were
checked and the task individually re-explained if subjects made any mistake.
Instructions were also reported on a white board.
After the task was completed, subjects performed a Raven Advanced Pro-
gressive Matrices (APM) test of 15 tables for 30 seconds each table, paid 0.20
of GBP per correct answer. Before this test we showed subjects a table with
an example of a matrix and the correct answer below for 1 minute, to explain
the logic of the test.
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The Raven test is a nonverbal test commonly used to measure reasoning
ability and general intelligence. In each test item, the tables show patterns
presented in the form of a 3 × 3 matrix, the subject is asked to identify the
missing element that completes a pattern. The Raven APM is appropriate for
adults and adolescents of higher average intelligence. The 15 tables presented
in order of progressive difficulty were selected from set II. Finally, a standard
Big Five personality questionnaire and other questions were presented to the
subjects who could answer with no time constraint. In particular we use
the Big Five Inventory (BFI) based on 44 question with answer coded on a
Likert scale. This version was developed by John, Donahue and Kentle (1991)
and recently investigated by John, Naumann and Soto (2008).8 The BFI is
particularly suitable for our purpose because specifically designed for a sample
of college and university students.
Implementation
We conducted 8 sessions for each treatment. In total 270 subjects (140 in the
control, 130 in the cooperative treatment) participated, all recruited from the
subject pool of the Warwick experimental laboratory. We used the DRAW
(“Decision Research at Warwick”) system, based on the ORSEE recruitment
software (the recruitment letter circulated is in the supplementary material).
Each session lasted 45 minutes. Subjects earned an average of about 11
GBP (approximately 18 USD), the participation payment was 4 GBP. The
breakdown and the dates of the different sessions are presented in table 8.9
The software used for the entire experiment is z-tree (Fishbacher, 2007).
In the appendix we present a more detailed description of the time-line of
the experiment. In the supplementary material we present the instructions and
the quiz on the instructions administered to subjects. The Ethical Approval
8The questions can be downloaded from Oliver P John’s website called the Berkeley
Personality Lab http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~johnlab/bfi.htm.
9In session 14 there was an odd number of subjects. This session was part of the cooper-
ative treatment, where subjects are paired, so a computer position was filled by a research
assistant who performed the addition tasks. This observation has been dropped from the
sample.
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of this design has been granted from Humanities and Social Sciences Research
Ethics Sub-Co at University of Warwick under DRAW Umbrella Approval
(Ref: 03/12-13).
3 Results
The descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented in tables 1 and
2. Correct 1 is the number of correct answers in the first sum S1, and Correct
2 is the number of correct answers in the second sum S2.10
It is important to note that Correct 2 is not significantly different in the
two treatments (with p−value = 0.53), while Correct 1 is slightly smaller by
about 0.4 in the cooperative treatment (with p−value = 0.06). This result,
perhaps of independent interest in experimental tests of mechanisms, shows
that one treatment is not particularly more efficient than the other in produc-
ing higher Correct 1 and Correct 2 and it is arguably a good characteristic
of our design because it increases the symmetry of the two treatments. We
are not considering the final answers S3, since this is heavily dependent on
the performances on S1 and S2. The reason we introduced the last task of
summing S1 and S2 was to stress the idea that the final task was a joint con-
tribution of the two subjects teamed together in the cooperative treatment.
Personality traits are measured on a scale between 1 and 5; Raven is the score
in the Raven APM.
Samples in the two treatments were homogeneous: there is no statisti-
cally significant (at the 5 percent level or even above this threshold) difference
between variables in the control and in the cooperative treatment if we con-
sider gender, age, personality traits, mathematics grades (the final high school
grade, in mathematics normalized between 0 and 1) quantitative (the nature of
the university degree subjects are undertaking coded as Yes= 1 and Not= 0 )
10In the control treatment there is one more Correct 1 observation than Correct 2. This
occurs because subject made an error in encoding his answer in the second series of additions.
There was no reason to drop the observation since this is uncontaminated by the subsequent
error.
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and non european (coded as 1 if the citizenship of the subjects is non european,
0 otherwise).
Table 3 presents the correlations between the individual characteristics:
personality traits, Raven and gender. Both the sign and the size of the cor-
relations are the ones expected, with Neuroticism negatively correlated to the
other traits.
Model
In order to assess the effect of the traits on the individual performances in the
two treatments, we estimate the model:
Correctj = βOO + βCC + βEE + βAA+ βNN + βRR+ (1)
β0 + βFF + ΓDay + e, j = 1, 2.
where O,C,E,A,N,R are the measures of Openness, Conscientiousness, Ex-
traversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Raven, respectively. F is equal to 1
if the subject is female, Day is the days’ dummies vector, representing the
day the subject i participated to the experiment. Note that Correct 1, in the
cooperative treatment is a clear measure of the subject to trust the anonymous
partner, because the output of this task is fully complementary for the final
result to the output produced by the partner.11 Given that the task requires
little skill but mostly attentional effort, we argue that the trust is respect to
attention and effort of the partner, not respect to his or her mathematical
skills. Whereas Correct 2 in the cooperative treatment is a clear measure of
the willingness of the subject to assist the anonymous partner, because the
output of this task is only used by the partner.
To help with the interpretation of the results, variables measuring person-
ality traits and Raven score have been rescaled to assume a value between 0
11In the discussion session, and in table 7 in particular, we will present some specific
evidence consistent with this interpretation.
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to 1, using for each variable the transformation:
xi =
xˆi − xˆmin
xˆmax − xˆmin (2)
where xˆ represent the original value and xˆmax and xˆmin are the maximum and
minimum value of the variables.
From the estimation of model 1, we will be able to assess the effect of the
traits, the fluid intelligence (as measured by the Raven test) and the gender on
individual performances in the cooperative and individual settings. In order to
provide a formal test of the differences of the effect of the above characteristics
in the two treatments we estimate another model, where we add to the equation
estimated in 1, the interacted term:
Coop ∗ (β′OO + β′CC + β′EE + β′AA+ β′NN + β′FF + β′RR) + Coop ∗ β′0
Where, Coop is 1 if the treatment is cooperative, β′0 represents the general
treatment effect, β′x represents the differential effect of the characteristics x
between the cooperative and individual treatments. A significant β′x implies
that there is a statistically significant difference between the two treatments
in the effect of characteristic x. Note that a positive (negative) coefficient
of the interacted terms, β′x that we will define as differential effect between
individual and cooperative treatment, will imply that x increases (decreases)
the performance more in the cooperative treatment than in the individual, or
baseline, treatment.
Model estimation
The estimated equations of model 1, analyzing performances in the first series
of additions, measured by Correct 1, and in the second series of additions,
measured by Correct 2 is presented in table 4.
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Conscientiousness
From table 4 we note that both Correct 1 and Correct 2 are increasing in
Conscientiousness in the cooperative treatment, while Conscientiousness has
a negative, but not significant effect in the baseline treatment. The overall ef-
fect of Conscientiousness is 2.5 additions, a quarter of the entire task for both
Correct 1 and Correct 2. From column 2 of table 5 we note that Conscientious-
ness has statistically significant positive differential effect in the cooperative
treatment for Correct 1. A positive differential effect seems to exist also for
Correct 2, as we note from column 4, although this last is non significant.
In figure 1, we plot the regression lines of Conscientiousness in both treat-
ments over Correct 1, we can observe this relation as well. We then make the
following:12
Observation 3.1. More conscientious subjects have a stronger performance in
a cooperative treatment, especially in trusting the partner; and they seem not to
have significantly larger performance in the control treatment (with individual
payment).
Agreeableness
From table 4, we note that the effect of agreeableness is non significant in
both treatments, nor it is significantly different in the two treatments as table
5 shows. Then, we can argue that:
Observation 3.2. More Agreeable subjects do not have higher performance in
the cooperative treatment, nor agreeableness is a predictor of performances in
the control treatment.
Neuroticism
Neuroticism has a negative impact in the control treatment as we note from
the coefficient of Neuroticism in columns 1 and 3 of table 4; its effect on the
12In Figure 3 and 4 in the appendix we report for completeness the comparison between
control and cooperative treatment for all the Big Five factors and for the Raven score.
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cooperative treatment seems positive, although it is not statisically significant
as we observe from columns 2 and 4.
Consistently with results from table 4, Neuroticism has a positive differ-
ential effect in the cooperative treatment as we note from columns 2 and 4
of table 5. Furthermore, considering the fourth column, from the magnitude
of the coefficients we conclude that an individual with high Neuroticism score
performs about 1.7 additions more in the cooperative than in the control treat-
ment (i.e. −3.5+5.1) in the second series of additions; which seems to suggest
that neurotic subjects seem to perform better in the cooperative treatment
than in the individual treatment.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation of performance in the second addition in
the two treatments and Neuroticism. The two regression lines show that less
neurotic individuals perform significantly better in the control treatment, while
more neurotic individuals perform better in the cooperative treatment. Fur-
thermore, the relation is clearly negative in the control and it seems positive
in the cooperative treatment. Therefore we make the following:
Observation 3.3. Subjects with higher Neuroticism score have a weaker per-
formance in the control treatment (with individual payment), but not in the
cooperative treatment, where they seem to have, if anything, a stronger perfor-
mance, especially in the task of helping the partner.
Gender Effects
From table 4 we note that female perform worse than male in the individual
treatments, but there is virtually no difference in the cooperative treatment.
Consistently with this result, from table 5 we note that there is a positive, al-
though weakly significant, differential effect between the treatments in Correct
1. We then make the following
Observation 3.4. Female subjects perform like male subjects in the coopera-
tive treatment but worse than male subjects in the individual treatment.
This observation is consistent with the findings that women are usually
considered more cooperative than men (see e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle
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and Vesterlund, 2007 and Kuhn and Villeval, 2013, for a more recent contri-
bution).
Opennes, IQ and Extraversion
Openness is weakly negatively associated with performances in cooperation at
the same time it does not have an effect in the baseline treatment, as we note
from table 4. Furthermore, from table 5, we observe that Openness seems
to have a negative differential effect in Correct 1 in cooperation. The Raven
score is a positive predictor of performances in both Correct 1 and Correct 2
(table 4). It seems stronger for the control treatment, although table 5 reject
the hypothesis of a significant differential effect. We will briefly discuss these
results in the next section.
Extraversion seems to be a negative predictor of performances in the in-
dividual treatment, but not in the cooperative treatment (table 4). However,
table 5 rejects the hypothesis of a statistically significant difference.
Finally note that in Figure 3 and 4 in the appendix we report for complete-
ness the comparison between control and cooperative treatment for all the Big
Five factors and for the Raven score.
Cooperative treatment
Finally as we have already argued at the beginning of this section, from
columns 1 and 3 of table 5 we observe that when we do not consider the
traits interacted by the dummy treatment, the dummy indicating the coop-
erative treatment are small or non significant. However, when we introduce
the interacted terms– measuring the differential effect of the traits in the two
treatments– performance in the first and in the second addition is substantially
lower in the cooperative treatment than in the control by 3.5 correct answers,
as economic analysis of the task suggests.13 Hence, comparing columns 1 and
2 and columns 3 and 4 respectively, we can argue that
13This is natural: when computing the first addition subjects anticipate that the quality
of the input of the others will be lower, so the return to effort is lower. In the second
addition, the monetary return to effort is zero.
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Observation 3.5. There is little differences in average performances when
individuals act singularly or in cooperation. But, once the effect of personality,
gender and intelligence are taken into account, these differences become very
large.
The model estimated above implicitly assumes substitutability between
skills – like diligence or ability to avoid distraction or notice errors– and effort.
A possible objection to this argument is that effort is complementary rather
than substitute of those skills; this would explain why subjects reporting more
agreeableness do not perform better in the cooperative treatment and espe-
cially in correct 2: their higher motivation deriving from the willingness of
helping the partner may result in higher effort, but this is not enough in itself
to guarantee better performances.
To test the validity of this explanation, we introduce in the model an in-
teractions between Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and
Raven, and Agreeableness and Neuroticism. If Agreeableness is complemen-
tary to the other traits to improve performances then when interacted with
these traits this should improve performances, and the interaction should re-
sult significant if subjects reporting high agreeableness were really willing to
help the partners. In table 6, we report the estimation of the model with the
three new interactions: Agreeableness and Raven in column 1, Agreeableness
and Conscientiousness in column 2, Agreeableness and Neuroticism in column
3. None of the interactions are in fact significant, hence more Agreeable sub-
jects even when they are also more skilled in performing for the task in our
experiment do not seem to be more helpful for the partners.14
4 Discussion
In our experimental design two identical tasks were performed under different
payment conditions. In one treatment the payment depended only on the effort
14For expositional simplicity we excluded the traits which are not directly involved and
the interactions between cooperation and these traits, introducing them in the regressions
will not affect our conclusions.
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and skill provided by the individual who would then receive the payment. In
the other, the final payment was dependent on effort and skill of the individual
and of another, randomly matched participant: in this case subjects knew that
during the execution of a part of the task, they would not directly benefit of the
outcome of their effort, benefit which would instead go to another participant
in the session. It may be useful to regard our design as a new, modified
version of the classical Trust Game: Both players have to decide how much
they trust the other, simultaneously and symmetrically, when they make the
first sum, because that effort will provide a return only if the other player
cooperates when her time comes to do the second sum. In the second move,
when they have to do the sum that the other will use, they do it before they
know how much effort the other contributed. In summary, our game can be
considered as simultaneous moves trust game, where the reciprocating move
is done before the player knows how much the other contributed, and effort
cost is real, non monetary. Thus our design gives a condition (the control)
that can be used in the comparison of performance when the effort directly
benefits (in terms of the payment) the individual who provides it as compared
to the environment where someone else enjoys those monetary benefits. In our
experiment, willingness and inclination to cooperate is tested by voluntary
provision of mentally costly effort that is improving the outcome of others.
The role of Agreeableness, Trust and Altruism
Possibly the most surprising and instructive conclusion of our study is
that the personality trait of a specifically social nature, Agreeableness, is not
associated with a significant difference in effort provision in the two treatments.
Given the questions in the survey, it is natural and plausible to identify a high
score in our measure of Agreeableness with a more generous and benevolent
stated attitude to others. The evidence of actions shows convincingly that
these statements are not necessarily followed by facts, particularly when the
cost associated with altruistic behavior is real effort rather than a monetary
transfer.
The regressions presented in table 7 further clarify our claim that Agree-
ableness does not predict better performances in the cooperative tasks. In
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this table we introduced the variables Trust corresponding to the answer (on
a scale from 1 to 5) to the question: I am someone who is generally trusting
and Altruism corresponding to the answer (also on a scale from 1 to 5) to
the question: I am someone who is helpful and unselfish with others. Both
questions contribute to the agreeableness score in our measurements. In par-
ticular, we introduced the two variables, together with their interaction with
the cooperative treatment dummy. We note that (see column 1) the sign of
the interaction with trust is positive and significant for the first series of addi-
tions, Correct 1. This is true also when we add our set of controls in column 3
(the coefficient is almost unchanged, although it becomes borderline significant
with a p−value = 0.055). It is also important to note that interaction with
trust is insignificant when regressed against Correct 2. These results confirm
our interpretation of Correct 1 as an index of trust on other people and also
suggest how this specific aspect of agreeableness is important for cooperation.
Instead, interaction with Altruism is negative and non significant, and this is
remarkable especially in the regression with Correct 2 that, we argued, is a
measure of how much people are willing to help others. This suggest that that
the statement of altruism is not necessarily followed by facts, when the cost
associated with altruistic behavior is real effort.
Experiments studying the association of personality traits with strategic
behavior, involving exchanges of monetary amounts, provided mixed evidence
that cooperative behavior is associated with Agreeableness. For example,
Hirsh and Peterson (2009) do not find Agreeableness to be associated with
choice of Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Pothos et al. (2010)
find that Agreeableness is not associated with choice of cooperation in the
PD, although it is associated in the same with off diagonal payoffs permuted
where cooperation is the dominant strategy. Filitz-Ozbay et al. (2013) find
that Agreableness is positively associated to mutual exchanges in a typical
gift-exchange game. Interestingly, in Anderson et al. (2009), Agreeableness
has a clear and positive effect on cooperation (in a sequential PD, which is
equivalent to a Trust Game), a similar result is found in Becker et al. (2012).
The discrepancy between the effect of the Agreeableness in the two above men-
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tioned games and in our real effort experiment can be explained by the nature
of the choice. Real effort is subject to a lower level of monitoring than the
transfer of the symbolic wealth during the experiment, hence individuals who
define themselves altruistic or socially oriented would feel less comfortable in
passing a smaller amount of money than putting a lower level of effort for
helping the partners. This interpretation finds support in Stoop et al. (2012),
who show that subjects contribute less to social outcomes when they perform
a real task than when they transfer experiment money.
The Effect of Conscientiousness and Neuroticism
If, instead of the verbal statements on personal inclination to help oth-
ers, one relies on the provision of costly effort in the control and cooperative
treatment as reliable evidence, then cooperative and trustful behavior is better
predicted by two other traits: Conscientiousness and Neuroticism. The effect
of Conscientiousness is particularly interesting. The effect on Correct 2 can
be explained by intrinsic motivation, conscientious individuals like to do “a
thorough job” independently from the monetary reward.
In more general terms, cooperating and productive behavior in organiza-
tions seems not the result of preferences over outcomes, but of attitudes to
processes. Conscientiousness has a direct effect on performance in the addi-
tion task only when the outcome is achieved cooperatively. This indicates
that Conscientiousness is associated with a positive response exclusively in
this condition, which seems the hallmark of what cooperation is. However,
more conscientious individuals do not seem to have better performance in the
individual treatment, which gives a direct incentive to do the sums correctly.
This finding lends support to the idea that conscientiousness provides intrinsic
motivation complementary to the extrinsic motivation of the monetary incen-
tives, rather than assigning special consideration to cooperation per se. For
Neuroticism, the same correlation of this traits with cooperative behavior has
been found by in Hirsch and Peterson (2009) and in Anderson et al. (2009;
see Table 9 and 10). The negative effect of Openness is in line with previous
findings. Although individuals with high levels of Openness may aid coopera-
tion in some particular instances where unconventional thinking is necessary,
21
such individuals are unfit in subordinating individual creativity in the context
of a collaborative work process, especially like the one subjects perform in our
experiment (Stewart et al.,2005).
In summary, the willingness and inclination to cooperation is affected more
by a conscientious attitude to work rather than positive and empathic attitude
to others. Highly conscientious individuals have a good performance in the
task irrespective of the incentives, due probably more to intrinsic motivation
than to private or social incentives. We believe this paper provides guidance
for the explanation of how personality traits score predict cooperative behav-
ior. In particular, it emphasizes the importance of trait revealing intrinsic
motivations, and warns about the inconsistency of the statements supposed
to measure the degree of altruism. Further research can clarify wether these
statements reveal something different than what it is commonly considered al-
truism, or whether this trait is more prone than others to measurement errors.
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Table 1: Control Treatment, Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Correct 1 7.243 2.26 1 10 140
Correct 2 7.583 2.242 1 10 139
Age 21.3 3.003 18 34 140
Female 0.514 0.502 0 1 140
Openness 3.573 0.589 1.9 5 140
Conscientiousness 3.452 0.626 1.667 4.889 140
Extraversion 3.333 0.704 1.625 4.875 140
Agreableness 3.71 0.559 2.111 5 140
Neuroticism 2.967 0.673 1.375 4.75 140
Raven 8.443 2.696 0 13 140
Trust 4.093 0.758 2 5 140
Altruism 3.957 0.847 1 5 140
Quantitative Degree 0.536 0.501 0 1 140
Maths Grades 0.881 0.146 0.5 1 132
Non European 0.307 0.463 0 1 140
Table 2: Cooperative Treatment, Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Correct 1 6.8 2.297 2 10 130
Correct 2 7.408 2.368 0 10 130
Age 21.969 4.59 18 52 130
Female 0.538 0.5 0 1 130
Openness 3.587 0.589 2.1 4.9 130
Conscientiousness 3.579 0.676 2 4.889 130
Extraversion 3.287 0.788 1.5 4.75 130
Agreeableness 3.639 0.617 2 5 130
Neuroticism 2.966 0.792 1.25 4.875 130
Raven 7.992 2.686 0 13 130
Trust 3.938 0.963 1 5 130
Altruism 3.831 0.982 1 5 130
Quantitative Degree 0.523 0.501 0 1 130
Maths Grades 0.887 0.156 0.25 1 123
Continued on next page...
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... table 2 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N


































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Analysis of the performances in the cooperative and indi-
vidual treatments Correct 1 are the correct additions used by the subject
performing them in both the individual and the cooperative treatment. Correct
2 are the correct additions passed to the respective partners in the cooperative
treatment. The variables representing personality traits and Raven have been
rescaled to take a value between 0 and 1. OLS estimator. Robust Standard
Errors in Brackets. ∗ p− value < 0.1, ∗∗ p− value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01
Correct 1 Correct 1 Correct 2 Correct 2
Individual Cooperative Individual Cooperative
Conscientiousness –0.6685 2.4018** 0.7552 2.5022**
(0.9396) (0.9483) (0.8567) (1.0157)
Agreeableness –0.3259 0.2419 0.1901 0.6456
(0.9604) (0.9812) (1.0431) (0.8859)
Neuroticism –2.2111** 0.7598 –3.0790*** 1.7509
(1.0466) (1.0949) (0.9841) (1.1308)
Extraversion –1.8612** 0.1382 –1.2449 –0.1008
(0.8360) (0.9002) (0.8460) (0.9927)
Openness 0.6460 –1.9571* –0.2136 –1.9179
(1.0451) (1.1492) (1.0067) (1.3872)
Raven 2.0717*** 1.2085 1.8569** 1.6243
(0.7611) (0.9531) (0.7621) (0.9801)
Female –1.0257*** 0.0294 –0.6615* 0.0304
(0.3487) (0.4096) (0.3536) (0.4161)
Constant 8.1001*** 4.5837*** 7.7627*** 3.9067**
(1.4526) (1.5441) (1.4007) (1.7848)
Day Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.250 0.179 0.227 0.191
N 140 130 139 130
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Table 5: Differences in the performances between the two treatments
Correct 1 are the correct additions used by the subject performing them in
both the individual and the cooperative treatment. Correct 2 are the correct
additions passed to the respective partners in the cooperative treatment. The
variables representing personality traits and Raven have been rescaled to take
a value between 0 and 1. OLS estimator. Robust Standard Errors in Brackets.
∗ p− value < 0.1, ∗∗ p− value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01
Correct 1 Correct 1 Correct 2 Correct 2
Cooperative Treatment –0.4857* –3.1315 –0.2324 –3.3711















Conscientiousness 1.0593 –0.7079 1.8109*** 0.7850
(0.6658) (0.9456) (0.6879) (0.8785)
Agreeableness 0.2724 –0.3594 0.5811 0.1176
(0.7144) (0.9572) (0.6776) (1.0076)
Neuroticism –0.1384 –1.9025* –0.0806 –2.8677***
(0.7745) (1.0619) (0.7631) (0.9718)
Extraversion –0.5850 –1.7780** –0.5496 –1.3116
(0.6302) (0.8481) (0.6467) (0.8614)
Openness –0.8371 0.8082 –1.2965 –0.0573
(0.7857) (1.0722) (0.8550) (1.0189)
Raven 1.8931*** 2.3042*** 1.9006*** 2.0144***
(0.6018) (0.7513) (0.5946) (0.7661)
Female –0.5440* –1.0137*** –0.3548 –0.6169*
(0.2763) (0.3515) (0.2655) (0.3549)
Constant 5.9512*** 7.7868*** 5.6253*** 7.4285***
(1.0771) (1.3824) (1.1395) (1.3164)
Day Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.133 0.199 0.138 0.193
N 270 270 269 269
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Table 6: Differences in the performances between the two treatments,
assuming that Agreeableness is complementary to other traits The
variables representing personality traits and Raven have been rescaled to take
a value between 0 and 1 have been rescaled to take a value between 0 and 1.
OLS estimator. Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. ∗ p − value < 0.1, ∗∗
p− value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01
Correct 2 Correct 2 Correct 2
M1 M2 M3
b/se b/se b/se
Cooperative Treatment 1.7984 –3.1698 –3.3437
(2.2881) (2.9464) (2.4019)


















Coop.*Raven –4.0428 –0.6372 –0.2318
(3.3825) (1.2310) (1.2223)
Coop.*Female 1.2138** 1.1584** 0.7020
(0.5654) (0.5616) (0.5605)
Conscientiousness 1.6949** –0.5417 1.7176**
(0.7078) (2.7432) (0.7156)
Agreeableness 2.0101 –1.0789 0.1295
(2.5143) (2.9770) (2.4828)
Neuroticism 0.0544 0.0946 –2.1731
(0.7555) (0.7600) (3.3296)
Raven 3.7218* 2.3401*** 2.1348***
(2.2505) (0.7827) (0.7516)
Female –0.9487*** –0.9370** –0.6799*
(0.3652) (0.3656) (0.3589)
Constant 3.7981** 5.9107*** 5.9117***
(1.6898) (1.8427) (1.7961)
Day Dummy Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.142 0.146 0.171
N 269 269 269
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Table 7: Differences in the performances between the two treatments
and the facets of Agreeableness Correct 1 are the correct additions used
by the subject performing them in both the individual and the cooperative
treatment. Correct 2 are the correct additions passed to the respective partners
in the cooperative treatment. The variables representing Altruism, Trust, and
Raven have been rescaled to take a value between 0 and 1. OLS estimator.
Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. ∗ p − value < 0.1, ∗∗ p − value < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01
Correct 1 Correct 2 Correct 1 Correct 2
Cooperative Treatment –2.0831* –0.0526 –2.3914* –0.5246
(1.1187) (1.2520) (1.2296) (1.4127)
Coop.*Altruism –0.6924 –1.3151 –0.2053 –0.8499
(1.2713) (1.3643) (1.2195) (1.2829)
Coop.*Trust 2.8739** 1.1416 2.7081* 0.9016





Altrusim –0.0703 0.1256 –0.0554 0.1796
(0.9851) (1.0997) (0.9113) (0.9811)
Trust –0.4365 0.6829 –0.6410 0.5017





Constant 7.6324*** 6.9617*** 6.4213*** 5.6572***
(0.8605) (1.0430) (0.9348) (1.0963)
Day Dummy No No Yes Yes
r2 0.036 0.018 0.165 0.123
N 270 269 270 269
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Figure 1: Correct sums in the 1st series of additions and Conscien-
tiousness. The dotted line is the control treatment, the solid line represents
the cooperative treatment, both the 95% confidence intervals are displayed .
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Figure 2: Correct sums in the 2nd series of additions and Neuroti-
cism. The dotted line is the control treatment, the solid line represents the
cooperative treatment, both the 95% confidence intervals are displayed .
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Appendix
Timeline of the Experiment
1. At the beginning participants were assigned a Project ID card, with a
number corresponding to a computer station and a paper in hard copy
with the illustration of the task they were going to perform. They were
asked questions at the end to check for comprehension.
2. An illustration of the task was presented on a white board.
3. Participants are seated in the laboratory at individual, private computer
terminals, corresponding to their Project ID cards.
4. Participants read and answer the questions in the instruction paper dis-
tributed to them to check their comprehension of the exercise.
5. In sessions 1, 4, 6, 7 participants face the control exercise. In sessions 2
of day 1 and 1 and 3 of day 2 they face the treatment exercise.
6. In the control treatment participants had to add three series of 10 two-
digit numbers in the following way:
(a) Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers in 4 minutes, let S1i be the answers provided.
(b) Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-
digits numbers in 4 minutes, let S2i be the answers provided.
(c) Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above and the 10 numbers
obtained in step 2 above, producing for each i an answer S3i in 2
minutes.
In the cooperative treatment subjects performed the same sequence of
additions, but jointly with an anonymous subject, as follows:
(a) Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers in 4 minutes, let S1i be the answers provided.
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(b) Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-
digits numbers in 4 minutes, let S2i be the answers provided.
(c) The output of these 10 additions, S2i , i = 1, . . . , 10 is transferred
to a randomly marched and anonymous partner, and the 10 num-
bers output produced by this partner is transferred in turn to the
subject. We denote by S∗2i the values of the sum that the partner
makes.
(d) Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above, S1i , and the 10 num-
bers obtained from the randomly matched partner, S∗2i , and pro-
ducing an output S3i in 2 minutes.
Let the Cki denotes the correct final amount from the three additions
k = 1, 2, 3 for each i. In both cases, the payment rule was 15 British
Pounds Sterling (GBP), approximately 26 US Dollars (USD), minus 1
in the event of an incorrect final sum: to be precise, the subject lost one
pound (and only one pound) for each i such that S3i 6= C3i .
7. Raven test, 15 tables for 30 seconds each table. Each correct answer was
paid 0.20 GBP.
8. The questionnaire is presented and filled.
9. Subjects were paid.
We report in the Supplementary Information the entire test for:
1. Instructions and Quiz questions for the control/individual treatment
2. Instructions Quiz questions for the cooperative treatment
3. General questions in the final Questionnaire
4. Personality Traits Questions and Scoring Instructions




Day Session Subjects Treatment
1 (13/06/2012) 1 15 Individual
1 (13/06/2012) 2 16 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 3 20 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 4 20 Individual
2 (14/06/2012) 5 16 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 6 16 Individual
3 (19/06/2012) 7 20 Individual
3 (19/06/2012) 8 10 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 9 16 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 10 20 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 11 15 Individual
4 (15/05/2013) 12 19 Individual
5 (15/05/2013) 13 16 Cooperative
5 (15/05/2013) 14 17 Cooperative
5 (15/05/2013) 15 16 Individual
5 (15/05/2013) 16 19 Individual
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Figures
Figure 3: Correct sums in the 1st series of additions, Personality traits
and Raven score. The dotted line is the individual (that is, baseline) treat-
ment, the solid line represents the cooperative treatment, both the 95% con-
fidence intervals are displayed .
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Figure 4: Correct sums in the 2nd series of additions, Personality
traits and Raven score. The dotted line is the individual (that is, baseline)
treatment, the solid line represents the cooperative treatment, both the 95%
confidence intervals are displayed .
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